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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

83-0694

20 JUN 1983

The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

My letter of 25 March 1983 reported to you the progress of the Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence) in acting on proposals submitted by the Interagency Groups for Counterintelligence and Countermeasures. I also informed you that the organizational studies called for in NSSD-2 were proceeding and, following SIG(I) consideration, would be forwarded to you with SIG action recommendations. [redacted]

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I am pleased to enclose a copy of a completed counterintelligence organizational study (Tab 1) prepared by FBI Director Webster's IG/CI which drew input from all elements of the counterintelligence community. The SIG(I) has unanimously approved the nine recommendations included in the study. They are outlined at Tab 2. I forward them with my approval and endorsement. [redacted]

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The IG/CI will task its members and, through them, the counterintelligence components to recommend specific actions to implement these recommendations requiring action. [redacted]

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The countermeasures organizational study, because of the multitude of organizations and subgroups and the complexity of the issues involved, will not be completed until the end of June. The SIG(I) will act promptly thereafter to discuss and act on its recommendations and forward it to you.

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At its meeting on 8 June, the SIG(I) discussed other matters related to countering the hostile intelligence threat, and I wish to report these actions for your information:

- (a) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has directed me to produce a report on the needs of the Intelligence Community for multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis. The Committee has also directed me to seek the advice and recommendations of a small Advisory Commission which I would establish, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, to

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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TOP SECRET

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analyze and define multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis requirements. Both the report and the Commission's recommendations are to be submitted to the Committee by 15 November 1983. I am proceeding to implement these actions. [redacted]

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(b) Terms of Reference for the 1983 annual Hostile Intelligence Threat Assessment are being distributed to the Intelligence Community elements which will be contributing material on which the Assessment will be based. We anticipate publication on or about 1 December 1983, in accordance with your 30 December 1982 letter to me. [redacted]

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(c) I am initiating formulation of a new DCI Committee to deal specifically with measures for improvement in multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis. The Committee idea is new and thought must still be given to its precise functions, membership, and location within existing structures. [redacted]

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I will keep you informed of our actions and progress in these matters. [redacted]

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Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

William J. Casey

Enclosures

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SUMMARY OF SIG(I) ACTIONCOUNTERINTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

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-- The SIG(I) and the IG/CI (and IG/CM) structures provide the CI agencies with workable fora for discussion and resolution of their concerns, and no changes are required.

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-- The CI agencies should share more operational and analytical experience for lessons to be learned.

-- Better coordination is needed between the military CI agencies and the FBI-CIA involving CI activities.

-- More cross-staffing at the analyst level should be accomplished between the CI agencies.

-- The CI agencies should continue to expand their analytical capability and the exchange of analytical product.

-- Integrated training between CI agencies should be expanded as resources permit.

-- CI career cadres should be enhanced through cross-staffing, integrated training, operational training, and advanced academic schooling.

-- Finally, a new centralized CI organization or changes in the authority and/or responsibilities of existing CI agencies would not enhance our national security interests. The current structure should be retained.

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C/CCIS/ICS:dmf [redacted] (15 June 1983)

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Distribution of D/ICS-83-0694:

- 0 - Addee (w/Enclosures 1 and 2) (Copy 18 of [redacted])
- 1 - DCI (w/Enclosure 2 only)
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- 1 - DD/ICS and D/ICS (w/Enclosure 2 only)
- 1 - [redacted] Exec. Sec., SIG(I) (w/Enclosure 2 only)
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- 1 - ICS Registry (w/Enclosure 2 only)
- 1 - CCIS subject (w/Enclosures 1 and 2) (Copy 19 of [redacted])
- 1 - CCIS chrono (w/Enclosure 2 only)

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